





"Importance of world's sharing the lessons of the accident and utilising them to enhance safety

WANO actions after Fukushima"

Jacques Regaldo, Chairman of WANO

The 46th JAIF Annual Conference – Tokyo, April 24 2013



Summary of the Presentation

- 1. Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
- 2. WANO after Fukushima: Safety assessments
- 3. WANO after Fukushima: Renewed WANO
- 4. International cooperation
- 5. Conclusion



Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO

T.M.I. INPO (1979)

+ modifications mainly in western Europe

Chernobyl WANO (1989)

+ modifications mainly in Russia & Europe





Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO

T.M.I. INPO + modifications in western Europe

Chernobyl WANO + modifications in Russia & Europe

Fukushima | IAEA action Plan

WANO BGM Decisions

Reaction in Japan

& nuclear international community



Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO

26 months after Fukushima

- Public trust strongly shaken
- Reviews of global nuclear fleet performed in most of the countries (stress tests)
- Many decisions enhancing global nuclear safety, including:
 - Upgrading safety procedures & equipment
 - Setting up rapid response forces (mitigation)
 - Reviewing nuclear safety organisations
- Aggressive programmes to build new units (Asia) but also phasing out of nuclear power (Germany)
- Situation in Japan:
 - 48 units are still shutdown
 - NRA (New regulation expected for July 2013)
 - JANSI



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WANO after Fukushima: Safety assessments

WANO issued a first SOER 6 days after Fukushima

SOER WANO

Significant Operating Experience Report

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused by Earthquake and Tsunami

March 2011

SOER WANO

Significant Operating Experience Report WANO SOER 2011-3

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Pool/Pond Loss of Cooling and Makeup

> August 2011 Limited Distribution

Significant Operating Experience Report WANO SOER 2011-4

Near-Term Actions to Address an Extended Loss of All AC Power

> December 2011 Limited Distribution

WANO will soon issue a fourth SOER on organisational and human performance issues



WANO after Fukushima: Safety assessments

All WANO members responded to SOERs. WANO analysed the answers, issued reports, made recommendations. Some are mandatory and are checked during Peer-Reviews.



SOER 2011-2 Recommendation Response Data

Analysis of SOER 2011-2 Recommendation Response Data

Summary of the Common Issues Identified during NPP Reviews of SOER 2011-2 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused by Earthquake and Tsunami Recommendations

July 2011 Restricted Distribution

REPORT WANO

SOER 2011-3 Recommendation Analysis

Analysis of SOER 2011-3 Recommendation Response Data

Summary of the Common Issues Identified During Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Reviews of SOER 2011-3 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Pool/Pond Loss of Cooling and Makeup Recommendations

April 2012 Limited Distribution

MANO

SOER 2011-4

Analysis of SOER 2011-4 Recommendation Response Data

Summary of the Common Issues Identified During Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Reviews of SOER 2011-4 Near-Term Actions to Address an Extended Loss of All AC Power Recommendations

> September 2012 Limited Distribution



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WANO set up a "Post Fukushima Commission" with 15 CEO members.

5 recommendations have been approved by the Board and unanimously adopted by the General Assembly during the Shenzhen Biennial General Meeting

These recommendations drive WANO to the following evolutions



Expand the scope of WANO

- Mitigation & Emergency Preparedness
- ☐ Design : Periodic safety re-assessment & permanent improvement process
- ☐ Spent Fuel Pools & dry storage on sites



Improve the Event Response Strategy

- ☐ Severe accident management
- Emergency organisation in cooperation with the IAEA & INPO
- ☐ Real time event communication



Increase the Credibility

- Quality & scope of Peer Reviews
- Corporate PR within 6 years
- ☐ Frequency of PR from 6 to 4 years
- ☐ Assessment of the plants (grade)



Increase the Visibility & Transparency

- Overall communication strategy
- WANO Year-End Reports
- WANO Centres Year-End Reports
- ☐ Transparency within WANO
- ☐ Transparency with the Public



Increase the Consistency

- Assessment of 4 Regional centres & WANO London Office
- Equivalency of reviews (with IAEA,INPO & JANSI, ... evaluations)



Increase WANO Resources

In 1989: 120 staff (<0,3 / unit)

In 2010, after Delhi: 150 staff (0,35 / unit)

In 2014 / 2015 : >400 staff (0,85 / unit)

In parallel: increase of <u>quality</u> of reviewers & team leaders



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International Cooperation

17/09/12 MoU between the IAEA and WANO








International Cooperation

- Revised IAEA WANO MoU signed September 17
- MoU calls for cooperation in several important areas:
 - Exchange of peer reviewers
 - Performance indicators
 - Coordination in the scheduling of OSART missions and peer reviews
 - Exchange of some information
 - WANO access to IAEA events database
 - IAEA access to SOER recommendations
 - Coordination meetings twice each year
 - Coordination during future serious events
- Cooperation with INSAG
 - WANO is a participant at all INSAG meeting
 - WANO plans to work closely with INSAG on an IAEA Fukushima report
- Participation of WANO in the ITAG (International Technical Advisory Group)



International Cooperation





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Risks remain!

- Risk of loss of public trust
- Risk of loss of trust of nuclear workers
- Risk of isolationism of some operators
- Risk of complacency & over-confidence of some operators



Safety is necessary to recover trust

Operators have individual & collective responsibility

Safety is only as strong as the weakest operator

WANO has a vital role to play in addition with other organisations



World landscape has changed

Worldwide energy mix has changed

Nuclear energy acceptance has changed

WANO must adapt

Moscow 1989 → Moscow 2013



Internal cooperation is an absolute necessity in the future

CEOs' involvement is a key factor to enhance nuclear safety company-wide



International Cooperation IAEA, INPO, JANSI, ...

Open mind to learn from each other & avoid isolation



High level of Safety



CEO Responsibility / involvement



Send adequate & skilled Resources to both WANO & Jins!

Efficient programmes (Peer Reviews, Technical Support Missions, Operating Experience...) performed by skilled Experts & Engineers





Strengthened support from WANO to the JNOs

- Long term shut down & Restart reviews in Japan
- Reinforcement of WANO Tokyo Centre workforce including additional experts from other Regions
- WANO participation to the JANSI International Advisory Group and Technical Review Group



Nuclear acceptance shaken by Fukushima

Credibility of Operators, responsible for safety

Skills & Transparency, no over-confidence

Credibility of Regulators:



Independence

International cooperation:



No isolation, no complacency





recover the public trust!



We all rely on each other to improve safety!



http://www.wano.info