

What can we learn from the German nuclear phase-out?

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
Wolfgang Denk, Liaison Officer, Alpiq Suisse SA, Switzerland
The 49th JAIF ANNUAL CONFERENCE , 12 April 2016




Political, technical and economical issues dominating nuclear energy



- No replacement of existing nuclear plants
- Green party: Shut down NPPs after 45 years
→ public vote in Nov. 2016



- Gösgen, Leibstadt operating normally, long outage in Beznau 2
- Beznau unit 1 in shut-down since March 2015 (RPV NDT testing results); restart not before July 2016
- BKW preparing 1st Swiss decommissioning project




- Low electricity prices
- Utilities wouldn't invest in new capacity, regardless of political nuclear phase-out



Trends in public opinion are challenging



«The existing NPP's are necessary for the security of supply.»



Source: Yearly Swiss telephone survey «Eckwertstudie»;
<http://www.swissnuclear.ch/upload/cms/news/Eckwertstudie26112015.pdf>

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What can we learn from the German nuclear phase-out?



“Ten years ago, hardly anyone
would have thought it possible.
Today, however, **we know** that
the energy transition **is**
technically and financially
feasible”

Quote: <http://bmwi.de/EN/Press/press-releases,did=757952.html> Photo: Thomas Köhler/photothek.net



“We want to demonstrate
that **sustainable energy
policy** makes sense both
from an **ecological** and an
economic point of view”


Quote: <http://bmwi.de/EN/Press/press-releases,did=757952.html>, Photo: Dominik Butzmann, SPD

Three main issues around the German nuclear phase-out and energy transition

- T** Technical feasibility
- F** Financial reality
- E** Environmental impact

Installed generation capacity in Germany [GW]

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
48% renewables - 52% fossil, nuclear & others

Source: BDEW, *2015 preliminary; [https://www.bdew.de/internet.nsf/res/FDFDE1F303A781EBC1257F61005AA43C/\\$file/160218_Foliensatz%20Energie-Info_Erneuerbare%20Energien%20und%20das%20EEG_2016_final.pdf](https://www.bdew.de/internet.nsf/res/FDFDE1F303A781EBC1257F61005AA43C/$file/160218_Foliensatz%20Energie-Info_Erneuerbare%20Energien%20und%20das%20EEG_2016_final.pdf)

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The German electricity generation mix in 2015 (gross generation: 652 TWh)




30% renewables - 70% fossil, nuclear & others

Source: BDEW


Gross electricity generation in Germany [TWh] 2000 - 2015

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
Data: AG Energiebilanzen, BDEW

Installed capacity vs. electricity generation and consumption




- Electricity consumption stayed the same since 2000
- Conventional thermal or nuclear capacity was not replaced
 - New renewables capacity as «add-on» to existing system
 - Load factors & fuel use of conventional plants reduced

Solar PV and Wind capacity «not usable» for the balance of supply and demand



Example for «technical feasibility»: 19-20 February 2016




Source: www.energy-charts.de

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
What can we learn from the German nuclear phase-out?

With 20GW more wind on a Saturday morning, hard coal, gas and lignite have to stop generating



Datasource: 50 Hertz, Amprion, Tennet, TransnetBW, EEX
Last update: 27 Feb 2016 23:14


With 20GW more wind on a Saturday morning, hard coal, gas and lignite have to stop generating



Datasource: 50 Hertz, Amprion, Tennet, TransnetBW, EEX
Last update: 27 Feb 2016 23:14

... and 5GW are additionally exported

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Datasource: 50 Hertz, Amprion, Tennet, TransnetBW, EEX
Last update: 27 Feb 2016 23:14


Source: www.energy-charts.de

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Generation of 80 GW capacity can be almost zero – example 1 January 2016, 16:15pm



Source: www.energy-charts.de

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What can we learn from the German nuclear phase-out?


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Germany «outsourcing» part of its problems to the neighbours – example: 23 August 2015, 1pm

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Solar PV & Wind generation



Exports




Source: www.energy-charts.de

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What can we learn from the German nuclear phase-out?

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Germany «outsourcing» part of its problems to the neighbours – example: 23 August 2015, 1pm



Source: www.energy-charts.de

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What can we learn from the German nuclear phase-out?

The German premature nuclear phase-out: 2500-4000 TWh of electricity to be replaced

Plant	Type	MWnet	Years shut-down before reaching 50 years [y]	Years shut-down before reaching 60 years [y]	Theoretical yearly generation with capacity factor of 85% [TWh]	Total generation "lost" compared to 50 years of operation [TWh]	Total generation "lost" compared to 60 years of operation [TWh]
<i>Biblis A</i>	<i>PWR</i>	<i>1167</i>	<i>13.8</i>	<i>23.8</i>	<i>8.7</i>	<i>120</i>	<i>207</i>
<i>Biblis B</i>	<i>PWR</i>	<i>1240</i>	<i>15.7</i>	<i>25.7</i>	<i>9.2</i>	<i>145</i>	<i>238</i>
<i>Brunsbüttel</i>	<i>BWR</i>	<i>771</i>	<i>15.8</i>	<i>25.8</i>	<i>5.7</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>148</i>
<i>Isar 1</i>	<i>BWR</i>	<i>878</i>	<i>17.9</i>	<i>27.9</i>	<i>6.5</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>182</i>
<i>Krümmel</i>	<i>BWR</i>	<i>1346</i>	<i>22.9</i>	<i>32.9</i>	<i>10.0</i>	<i>229</i>	<i>330</i>
<i>Neckarwestheim I</i>	<i>BWR</i>	<i>785</i>	<i>15.6</i>	<i>25.6</i>	<i>5.8</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>150</i>
<i>Philippsburg 1</i>	<i>BWR</i>	<i>890</i>	<i>18.9</i>	<i>28.9</i>	<i>6.6</i>	<i>125</i>	<i>191</i>
<i>Unterweser</i>	<i>PWR</i>	<i>1345</i>	<i>18.4</i>	<i>28.4</i>	<i>10.0</i>	<i>184</i>	<i>284</i>
<i>Grafenrheinfeld</i>	<i>PWR</i>	<i>1275</i>	<i>16.9</i>	<i>26.9</i>	<i>9.5</i>	<i>161</i>	<i>255</i>
Gundremmingen B	BWR	1284	16.6	26.6	9.6	158	254
Brokdorf	PWR	1410	17.0	27.0	10.5	178	283
Grohnde	PWR	1360	15.1	25.1	10.1	153	255
Gundremmingen C	BWR	1288	15.1	25.1	9.6	144	240
Philippsburg 2	PWR	1402	15.3	25.3	10.4	160	264
Emsland	PWR	1329	15.5	25.5	9.9	153	252
Isar 2	PWR	1400	15.3	25.3	10.4	160	264
Neckarwestheim II	PWR	1310	16.3	26.3	9.8	159	257
Total		20480				2530	4055

« Ce qu'on voit et ce qu'on ne voit pas » (That Which Is Seen and That Which Is Not Seen)




Frédéric Bastiat, 1801-1850

The parable of the broken window:
Money spent on broken windows cannot
be spent on other things
→ Opportunity costs should be recognized

What do you call a system where 80% of the final price is being determined by government?


Total: 28.7 EURct./kWh, RES subsidies: 6.35 EURct./kWh

Average composition of the electricity price 2016 for a household in Germany with 3.500 kWh yearly consumption



Source: graph based on BDEW


Total subsidies per new renewable technology over the total installed capacities in Germany



Source: graph by BDEW, remarks added by W. Denk; as of 2015: Grid operators forecast

Subsidies paid under EEG vs. Electricity produced

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
Source: BDEW

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Estimation of subsidies paid & committed for all capacity that came online from 2000 until 2016



Source: estimation W. Denk based on BDEW data

- Materials use for plant capacity
 - Visual impact (onshore wind turbines)
 - Noise emissions (onshore wind turbines)
 - Impact on animal life (wind turbines)
 - Increase of food prices and monoculture (biomass)
 - Additional grid capacity to be built
 - Reducing of load factors of existing capacity is increasing environmental impact per kWh
 - Dedicated smart metering capacity to be built
 - Dedicated battery capacity to be built
- New renewables have substantial environmental impact

19th century Gothic style castle Braunfels, Hesse: **ALPIQ**

"It looks a bit like from a fairy tale, but it's real!"



Source: <http://www.schloss-braunfels.de/en/braunfels-castle.html>

Castle Braunfels with seven wind turbines in Hohenahr (16 km away)

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
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Source: <http://www.burgerbe.de/2014/01/21/windrader-vor-schloss-braunfels/>; Photo: Meinolf Schmidt

Public Electricity and Heat Production in EU-28: CO₂-emissions from solid fuels

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Germany emits by far the largest amount (282 million tons)

What can we learn from the German nuclear phase-out and energy transition?


1. None of the shut-down nuclear capacity has been replaced by solar PV or wind capacity.
2. Solar PV and Wind do not contribute to supply and demand balance of transmission grid operators.
3. The technical feasibility is not ensured and already now relies on neighbouring countries.
4. Massive subsidies have lead to a planned-economy style system with numerous unintended consequences.
5. The level of Solar PV subsidies is being reduced but is still absurdly high compared to market prices.
6. If reducing CO₂ emissions would have been a top priority, then fossil capacity should have been reduced.

Does the German energy policy «make sense both **ALPIQ** from an ecological and an economic point of view?»

German energy policy



One possible alternative



* Assuming the construction of a fleet of 57 nuclear units with (1'500 MW, 9 bn EUR per unit)

** Assuming 85% capacity factor (= 633 TWh/a) and 60 years life-time

Thank you very much!

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