





U.S. Government Response Multi-Agency Assistance to Japan

HHS

•Provided expert advice - including regarding the use of potassium iodide or the need to use bottled water

DOE /NNSA •Provided specialized robotic aquiament to

equipment to Japan •Conducted various nuclear analyses

Provided aerial measurement systems
Conducted thousands of air

and field samples in Japan •Analyzed samples at U.S. national

labs

NRC

•Provided modeling and analytical support to U.S. and Japanese organizations.

- •Deployed expert team to Japan with experience including:
 - BWR reactor safety systems
 Dose assessment
 - Protective measures

AID

 Coordinated overall USG relief efforts.
 Deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team to support emergency response.
 Provided \$6.3 million in humanitarian assistance, including urban search and

rescue (USAR) activities.

U.S. Embassy Japan Focal point for assistance effort and for providing information to American citizens in Japan Embassy Staff Grew by 150 during the Crisis

DoD

•Multifaceted support for relief efforts including delivery of tons of water, food and medical supplies to affected areas

•Provided \$88.6 million in humanitarian assistance

•Conducted USAR operations and transport of USAR cargo

•Assured safety of U.S. military personnel based in Japan. FEMA

•Deployed search and rescue teams to Japan to conduct missions utilizing canines and listening devices

USNRC We Must Learn the Big Lessons

- Understand the Risks Facing Each Plant
- We Can't Predict
 Every Event
- Recovering from Disaster is At Least as Important as Preparing for Disaster



 Potential for Common Cause Failure of On-Site and Off-Site AC Power

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USING Bride und the Reviewances Are Safe

- No imminent risk from continued nuclear power plant operation and licensing activities.
- Similar events in the U.S. very unlikely.
- Mitigation measures already in place could reduce the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases.
- 12 Technical recommendations to further enhance U.S. nuclear safety.



USANCE DESCRIPTION OF THE DESCR

- Reevaluation of All External Hazards for Each Plant
- Enhanced Station Black Out Rulemaking
- Mitigating Strategies for Beyond Design Basis Events
- Installation of Reliable Hardened Vents for BWR Mark I and Mark II Containments
- New Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Requirements
- Integration of Emergency Procedures
- Staffing and Communications for Multiunit Events

USING What's Next? In the US – Major Policy Questions

- Should We Further Revise our Approach to Emergency Planning?
- Should more Spent Fuel be Removed from Pools and Placed in Dry Storage?
- Do We Need a New Regulatory Regime to Address Beyond Design Bases Events?
- Do We Need to Revise Our Regulatory Approach to Look Beyond Safety and Address Large Socioeconomic Disruptions?

US.NRC Water Province The Decision of the Deci

PILLAR ONE: EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL

•Regulatory Agencies and Plant Operators MUST have high-quality, technically experienced staffs

- Neither should rely on outside organizations for core technical expertise—such reliance can be disastrous in an emergency
- Academic training and management expertise is important but deep experience in operations and regulatory oversight is more important



PILLAR TWO: INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING

•Regulatory Officials and Plant Operators MUST have the ability to make IMMEDIATE decisions regarding plant safety

- Plant Operators should be authorized and EXPECTED to make decisions on-the-spot when circumstances warrant
- Regulatory decisions should have a clear technical bases
- National policy authorities should be reluctant to become involved in purely regulatory decisions

USNEC Woving Beyond Fukushima Dai-ichi

PILLAR THREE: SAFETY CULTURE

•All organizations involved in nuclear operations and safety oversight must develop an effective safety culture

- A strong safety culture is the first and last line of defense
- Vital to emphasize a questioning attitude in all operational choices and regulatory decisions
- Important to establish an atmosphere in which all personnel can raise concerns without fear



PILLAR FOUR: TRANSPARENCY

•Regulatory and Operational decisions should be made in a transparent fashion

- Recognize that the public has a RIGHT to know!
- Demonstrating that decisions are made on the technical facts with safety as the highest interest will build public trust and confidence—even when members of the public disagree with the decision
- Public will understand the need to protect security information

USNEC Four Pillars of Nuclear Safety *Moving Beyond Fukushima Dai-ichi*

- Experienced Personnel
- Independent Decision-Making
- Safety Culture
- Transparency

We knew this before Fukushima After Fukushima, all can see that these pillars are invaluable and essential for future safety

USNEC With the Market Market



13



- The U.S. and other nations rely on Japanese capabilities and expertise to support new nuclear construction
- Japanese research and development into advanced fuel cycles and Generation IV reactors is a global asset
- Japanese leadership is essential to address global issues such as nonproliferation and climate change

