

From the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS: Efforts to Improve Safety

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President and CEO, AREVA
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Agenda

▶ Safety assessments in the EU and in France

▶ AREVA

▶ Safety of our customers

▶ Safety of our activities


▶ Safety of our products

▶ Some general initial conclusions





EU Agreement on Safety Checks



- ▶ Assessments undertaken *simultaneously* by operators in the EU as of June 1, 2011
- ▶ 15 countries (inc. Lithuania) and 145 reactors
- ▶ Scope: extraordinary triggering events and the consequences of other initiating events



Complementary Safety Assessments in France 1/2



- ▶ Complementary Safety Assessment process was launched by the French nuclear safety authority (ASN)
 - ◆ At the request of the French Prime Minister
 - ◆ Concerns 150 nuclear installations
 - ◆ Organizational and human factors taken into account
 - ◆ Involvement of various stakeholders
- ▶ ASN report on 79 priority installations was issued on January 3, 2012
 - ◆ All these reports are public
 - ◆ Report to be sent by September 15 for the remaining installations





Complementary Safety Assessments in France 2/2



▶ General conclusions of the French nuclear safety authority report:

- ◆ No immediate shutdown of any of the facilities is required
- ◆ A sufficient level of safety is currently achieved for all the facilities
- ◆ EDF proposed improvements which are a satisfactory response to the safety objectives
- ◆ Principle of a “hard core” of safety approved
- ◆ Nuclear Rapid Response Force



French installed base will be equipped with a new, complementary level of defense-in-depth. It is a new step in terms of global safety.



BUT nuclear safety cannot be boiled down to the aftermath of Fukushima. There always have been regular inspections to audit existing safety measures and strict ten-yearly in-service inspections.



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Safety is at the Heart of the AREVA Strategy



Safety of our customers



**AREVA
Safety Alliance**

Providing support to utilities: demonstrating and strengthening the safety of their facilities

Safety of our activities



Nuclear safety
& radiation protection

Ensuring the highest level of nuclear and industrial safety at all stages of the facilities' life cycle

Safety of our products

EPR™

ATMEA

KERENA™

A portfolio of Gen III+ reactors with the highest safety standards



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AREVA Safety Alliance Initiative

► Engaging with utilities to help them meet ever-increasing safety requirements – now more than ever in the post-Fukushima context:

- ◆ 2011 Nuclear Executive Meeting
 - 18 CEOs and CNOs from Europe, USA and Asia
- ◆ AREVA 2012 Safety Alliance Seminars
 - Fleet Safety, Frankfurt - May
 - Public Confidence, Paris - June
 - Nuclear Economics, London - September

NUCLEAR EXECUTIVE MEETING
Paris, September 29-30, 2011




► A safety framework structured around three imperatives:

- ◆ Resistance to Major Hazards
- ◆ Robustness of Cooling Capability
- ◆ Prevention of Environmental Damage



The 6 Main Safety Themes



1 Safety Margin Reassessment

Confirm Plant Design Basis and reassess margins for Major Hazards

Preparing approaches to support utilities :

- ▶ Answer inquiries during the safety check process
- ▶ Define appropriate action plans to comply with potential future regulation



**Example 1:
Safety Margin Re-Assessment**

- ▶ Identify potential weak points systematically, including cliff-edge effects (fire, flood, severe weather conditions..)
- ▶ Develop mitigation plans
- ▶ Increase grace period as necessary

**Example 2:
Seismic Analysis Evaluating
NPP Behavior**

- ▶ Seismic margin assessment
- ▶ Evaluation of reactor coolant system, piping and supports and other safety systems
- ▶ Recommendation of needed design improvements



2 Robustness of Cooling Function

Comply to the future requirements in term of grace period and robustness

Preparing an optimized combination of Safety Upgrades:

- ▶ Diversified Water and Power Supply
- ▶ SBO Solutions
- ▶ Alternate Power Supply for Monitoring, Control, Communications, Habitability
- ▶ Alternate Heat Sink (Reactor and Pools)



Safety Upgrade Examples:

- ▶ Flexibility to use existing Power & Water sources
- ▶ Alternate and Protected Heat Sink
- ▶ Primary and Secondary Bleed and Feed
- ▶ Hardened Diesels
- ▶ Flood-Proof motors
- ▶ Diversified and Bunkerized Water and Power Supply Buildings
- ▶ Fuel Cells (Helion) pre-series stage

R&D Example:

- ▶ Mobile plug and play Power and Water Supply



3

Release Prevention


Protect the public and the Environment

Preparing a combination of Safety Upgrades:

- ▶ Containment Integrity Protection (Venting)
- ▶ Radioactive release prevention (Filtering)
- ▶ Monitoring of Severe Accident Conditions
- ▶ Prevention of Hydrogen explosions



Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner (PAR)



Containment Filtered Venting System

Safety Upgrade Example:

- ▶ Filtered Containment Venting Systems largest references worldwide for PWRs (including VVERs), CANDUs, BWRs
- ▶ Backfitting PARs to existing Operating Plants

R&D Project Example:

- ▶ Improve Capture Efficiency of Organic Iodine




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Robustness of Monitoring & Control

Ensure the continuity of Monitoring and Control during the SBO grace period and under Severe Accident Conditions

Preparing a combination of Safety Upgrades:

- ▶ Hardened and augmented Monitoring and Control systems
- ▶ Remote capabilities
- ▶ Computer systems to track, analyze, and manage diverse data (radiation, temperature, pressure, ...)
- ▶ Independent monitoring and control power



Safety Upgrade Example:

- ▶ Hardened Spent Fuel Pool Level Sensor
- ▶ HERMETIS hydrogen monitoring
- ▶ PRONAS containment gas sampling system
- ▶ AREVA/Canberra radiation and environmental monitoring

R&D Project Example:

- ▶ Remote Monitoring and Control mobile container
- ▶ Enhanced Spent Fuel Pools environmental monitoring



5

Safety Procedures and Emergency Support

Effectively utilize personnel and equipment

Preparing for the enhancement of Safety Procedures & Emergency Support :

- ▶ Analytical basis for Severe Accident Management Procedures
- ▶ Training and Simulation
- ▶ Equipment and Support for Emergency Forces



Safety Upgrade Example :

- ▶ Currently supporting the PWR owner's group in the US to detail SAMGs
- ▶ Simulators and training covering severe accident

R&D Project Example :


- ▶ Accident management Container
- ▶ Emergency monitoring systems
- ▶ Qualification of essential equipments for Severe Accident Conditions




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Safe and Optimized Used Fuel Management

- ▶ Harden pools to meet potential new safety guidance & requirements
 - ◆ Safety and Risk Analysis
 - ◆ Safety Upgrades (e.g. Improving robustness of cooling capabilities, remote control, SFP make-up)
 - ◆ Safety procedures (e.g. Enhancing contingency arrangements and training)
- ▶ Reduce used fuel inventory and radionuclide in reactor pools
 - ◆ Near term, by shipping used fuel for Recycling (e.g. less than 1 year of cooling)
 - ◆ Should recycling not foreseen in the near term, Transfer Used Fuel to Dry (3 to 5 years of cooling)
- ▶ Prepare for rapid transportation, if used fuel shipping is needed



Working closely with Users Groups worldwide 31 projects launched in 11 countries - March 2012



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Constant Investments for a High Level of Safety



- ▶ Over the period 2007 – 2011 our CAPEX related to safety stood at €2 billion
 - ◆ Renewal/replacement and upgrading of our industrial facilities
 - ◆ Deployment of the most advanced technologies
 - ◆ Development and optimization of nuclear fuel

- ▶ For the period 2012 – 2016 we will invest a further €2 billion in safety



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


EPR™ and ATMEA1 reactors: designed to meet the most demanding nuclear and industrial safety standards




Ability to withstand exceptional accidents and natural events

- ▶ External shell
- ▶ Earthquake proof
- ▶ Doors able to withstand explosions and flooding



Ability to withstand an airplane crash

- ▶ External containment protecting critical buildings



Reducing the risk of a serious accident with core melt

- ▶ Independent safety trains + physical separation
- ▶ Emergency diesel generators in two different buildings



No impact on local populations near the site in the event of a serious accident

- ▶ Core catcher: to collect the corium



Designed to benefit from nuclear accident lessons, they would have resisted Fukushima



Post-Fukushima Safety Authorities' Assessments on AREVA Designs



- ▶ Safety checks performed in Europe following European directives highlighted the intrinsic Robustness of the EPR™ design:
 - ◆ France: the National Authority ASN reported that “*the enhanced design of [the EPR™ reactor] ensures already an improved robustness with respect to the severe accident*” in its Complementary Safety Assessment (CSA)
 - ◆ Finland: STUK highlighted in its final report that “*Earthquakes and flooding are included in the design to ensure safety functions to a high level of confidence*”
 - ◆ UK: ONR issued the EPR™ interim Design Acceptance in December '11, stating that there is no ‘*show stopper*’ regarding EPR™ safety
 - ◆ France: ASN’s final report on the safety of the joint AREVA/MHI ATMEA 1 has approved ATMEA 1’s safety and design options, pointing out that ATMEA 1 “*took into account lessons learnt from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident*”.





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Safety lessons from Fukushima (I)



1. The Fukushima accident did not put in doubt current Gen 3+ safety options for reactor safety. On the contrary, it confirmed them.

- ▶ Major Gen3+ designs would have survived the accident
- ▶ Only Gen3+ options are acceptable for new builds from now on.
- ▶ Since Japan and France are respected Gen 3+ designers, the situation can be turned to our common advantage on the export market.

2. The accident showed the need for better emergency response systems, procedures and organizations

- ▶ Dimension emergency response systems for a simultaneous accident on several reactors
- ▶ Plan for solid and redundant communication lines in accident situations and try them out repeatedly in advance.
- ▶ Put in place the organizational capacity and resources required to manage and emergency situation



Safety lessons from Fukushima (II)



3. No single safety device or philosophy is 100% safe. Therefore, the key word is “redundancy”
 - ▶ Reactors must be as robust as possible against external shocks, then have multiple redundant safety devices to keep cooling capacity;
 - ▶ If all else fails, passive devices must be included to protect the environment;
 - ▶ There is no magic bullet: both passive and active safety concepts have a role.
4. Public acceptance will be key to the restart of nuclear around the world ; it will require more than ever a policy of transparency and continuous dialogue
5. We are all in this together
 - ▶ An accident somewhere is an accident everywhere; the entire industry must show solidarity. As a leader, AREVA will continue to play its part.
 - ▶ A long work lies ahead to clean up the site and allow a return to normal life. AREVA is ready to support this work with all its experience and technologies.

